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BANKRUPTCY LAW
Michael A. Condyles*
I. INTRODUCTION
This survey article reviews and analyzes legislative and judicial
developments that have occurred in bankruptcy law between April,
1991 and April, 1992. The article is intended to alert the general
practitioner to significant recent developments in the bankruptcy
area. Legislative changes made to Virginia statutory law and fed-
eral bankruptcy decisions issued within the Fourth Circuit are the
focus of this article.
Several United States Supreme Court decisions have been
handed down that clarify areas of bankruptcy law where judicial
opinions had conflicted. Those decisions addressed in this article
affect the treatment of claims of secured creditors. However,
neither legislative nor judicial developments have markedly altered
existing law. This article will survey developments which will affect
both debtors and creditors in connection with the administration
of bankruptcy cases.
II. TREATMENT OF SECURED CLAIMS
Several bankruptcy decisions rendered during the survey period
affect the manner in which a secured creditor's claim will be
treated in a bankruptcy case. Of particular interest is Johnson v.
Home State Bank,' in which the United States Supreme Court ad-
dressed the treatment of a mortgagee's claim in connection with
multiple bankruptcy filings by a debtor. In addition, in Dewsnup v.
Timm,2 the Court addressed the ability of a debtor to "strip down"
a secured creditor's lien against real estate that has been aban-
doned as an asset of the bankruptcy estate. Other judicial deci-
* Associate, Maloney, Yeatts & Barr, a Professional Corporation, Richmond, Virginia;
B.A., 1984, James Madison University; J.D., 1987, T. C. Williams School of Law, University
of Richmond. The author is a former law clerk to the Honorable Blackwell N. Shelley,
United States Bankruptcy Court Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, Richmond
Division.
1. 111 S. Ct. 2150 (1991).
2. 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992).
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sions have discussed the treatment of an assignment of rents
clause contained in a deed of trust, and a debtor's ability to avoid
a judicial lien which impairs an exemption against real estate. The
following analysis reviews these developments.
A. Treatment of a Mortgagee's Claim in Connection with a
Debtor's Multiple Filings
Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Johnson v. Home
State Bank,; a conflict existed among the federal circuit courts
over whether a debtor could file a Chapter 13 petition in order to
pay off arrearages on his mortgage, despite having received a dis-
charge for the debt in a prior Chapter 7 case.4 The filing of a Chap-
ter 13 bankruptcy petition by a debtor, following the same debtor's
prior filing of a Chapter 7 case, is often referred to by courts as a
Chapter 20.1 Because the Bankruptcy Code fails to impose any re-
strictions on multiple filings," courts have determined that they are
3. Johnson, 111 S. Ct. at 2150.
4. See In re Johnson, 904 F.2d 563 (10th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2150 (1991); In re
Saylors, 869 F.2d 1434, 1436 (11th Cir. 1989); In re Metz, 820 F.2d 1495, 1498 (9th Cir.
1987).
5. See In re Johnson, 904 F.2d at 563; In re Rasmussen, 888 F.2d 703 (10th Cir. 1989);
Southtrust Mobile Servs., Inc. v. Englebert, 137 B.R. 975 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1992); In re
Hornlein, 130 B.R. 600 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991); In re Doss, 133 B.R. 108 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1991); In re Ward, 129 B.R. 664 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1991).
6. 11 U.S.C. § 109(g) (1988) does restrict eligibility for filing a bankruptcy case in certain
instances. For example, § 109(g) prevents an individual or a family farmer from filing a
bankruptcy petition when such person has been a debtor in a case during the prior 180 days,
if the prior case was dismissed by the court because the debtor willfully failed to abide by
the orders of the court or to appear before the court in proper prosecution of the case. This
limitation is intended to apply narrowly to only those debtors who intentionally obtain a
dismissal of their bankruptcy case in order to file another case or who consciously abuse the
bankruptcy system. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 11300.40, at 1300-88 (15th ed. 1992).
Section 109(g) also prevents a debtor from filing a new case where the debtor voluntarily
requests and obtains a dismissal of a prior case within the 180 days preceding the filing of a
request for relief from the automatic stay provided by 11 U.S.C. § 362. This limitation is
designed to prevent a debtor from abusing the bankruptcy system. A debtor cannot file new
bankruptcy cases and re-invoke the automatic stay immediately after a creditor has sought
or obtained relief from the automatic stay in a prior case. Id. The 180-day limitation is
intended to provide a creditor with sufficient time to obtain relief from the stay and to take
the necessary action to foreclose on its collateral while still affording a debtor the opportu-
nity to seek bankruptcy relief. Id.
Certain limitations on a debtor's ability to file a bankruptcy case are also imposed under
11 U.S.C. § 727. Section 727(a)(8) provides that a debtor shall not be granted a discharge
under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code if that debtor has been granted a discharge under
the same section or under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in a case commenced within
six years of the date of the filing of the subsequent petition. Section 727(a)(9) also limits a
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not improper per se.7
Instead, to determine the appropriateness of a Chapter 13 filing
in such instances courts have evaluated whether a mortgagee main-
tains a "claim" as defined by the Bankruptcy Code that can be
included in the Chapter 13 proceeding. The term "claim" is
broadly defined under the Bankruptcy Code.' In Johnson the
Court determined that there are two components to the enforce-
ment of a claim." First, an in personam action can be brought
against the debtor individually to-impose personal liability for the
amount owed. Second, an in rem action can be brought to collect
the amounts owed by executing against the property which serves
as collateral.'0
In Johnson, the Court also found that a Chapter 7 discharge
only extinguishes the right to proceed against the debtor person-
ally. Since the right to execute against the collateral still exists, the
creditor still maintains a claim which can be made subject to the
Chapter 13 provisions of the Bankruptcy Code."
The Court's determination that a secured creditor maintains a
claim in instances where a debtor has been discharged of his per-
sonal liability is especially important in the Chapter 13 context.
Under the Bankruptcy Code, the Chapter 13 debtor can alter the
debtor's ability to obtain a discharge in Chapter 7 after having received a discharge under
Chapters 12 or 13.
7. In re Saylors, 869 F.2d at 1434; In re Metz, 820 F.2d at 1495. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3)
requires that as a condition to the confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan of reorganization, the
plan must be proposed in good faith. Courts have examined this good faith requirement to
determine whether a basis exists to dismiss a Chapter 13 filing that follows a filing of a
Chapter 7 case by the same debtor. See, e.g., In re Saylors, 869 F.2d at 1434; In re Metz,
820 F.2d at 1495. Since Congress did not impose a limitation on repetitive bankruptcies
when it enacted the good faith requirement, the filing of a Chapter 13 case shortly after a
debtor has obtained a discharge under Chapter 7 is not prohibited by § 1323(a)(3). In re
Saylors, 869 F.2d at 1434; In re Metz, 820 F.2d at 1495. Instead, courts have imposed a
limitation only where there is a showing of serious misconduct or abuse after an examina-
tion is performed of the "totality of the circumstances." In re Smith, 848 F.2d 813 (7th Cir.
1988); In re Caldwell, 851 F.2d 852 (6th Cir. 1988); In re Metz, 820 F.2d 1495 (9th Cir.
1987); In re Waldron, 785 F.2d 936 (11th Cir. 1986); Barnes v. Whelan, 689 F.2d 193 (D.C.
Cir. 1982); see Johnson, 111 S. Ct. at 2150.
8. The Court relied on its ruling in Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare v. Daven-
port, 110 S. Ct. 2126 (1990), to support its determination that Congress intended to adopt
the broadest available definition of the term "claim."
9. Johnson, 111 S. Ct. at 2154.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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rights of holders of secured claims in certain instances. 2 For exam-
ple, a debtor can cure a loan default under a plan and provide for
the repayment of any arrearage over the life of such plan. 3 A
debtor can also modify a creditor's rights by reducing a secured
claim to reflect the value of the collateral. 4
In Johnson, the Supreme Court did not directly address whether
serial filings under Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 constitute bad
faith.' 5 Instead, the Court indicated that the totality of the circum-
stances must be analyzed.' 6 The Court's finding that the debtor
may repay a secured claim in connection with a Chapter 13 filing
after first having been discharged of any personal liability in con-
nection with a Chapter 7 proceeding produces a favorable result
for debtors. This holding may encourage more serial filings under
Chapters 7 and 13, and may encourage debtors not to reaffirm
their indebtedness to secured creditors in Chapter 7 cases.' 7
B. Assignment of Rents
The treatment of an assignment of rents received from real es-
tate continues to be a developing area of bankruptcy law. In the
12. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988). Under § 1322(b)(2), a debtor can modify a secured
claim, "other than a claim secured only by a security interest in real property that is the
debtor's principal residence. . ." Id.
13. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c) provides that a Chapter 13 plan may not allow for payments over
a period that is longer than three years, unless the court, for cause, approves a period that is
not longer than five years.
14. In In re Gadson, 114 B.R. 453 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1990), the bankruptcy court held that
a homeowner in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case could reduce a creditor's claim secured by a
deed of trust only on the debtor's principal residence to reflect the value of the collateral.
The court's decision turned on a comparison of two provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, §§
506 and 1322(b)(2). See Michael A. Condyles, Bankruptcy Law: Annual Survey of Virginia
Law, 25 U. RICH. L. REv. 607, 621 (1991).
15. Johnson, 111 S. Ct. at 2156.
16. Id. The Court in Johnson stated:
Congress has expressly prohibited various forms of serial filings. . . . The absence of
a like prohibition on serial filings of Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 petitions, combined
with the evident care with which Congress has fashioned these express prohibitions,
convinces us that Congress did not intend categorically to foreclose the benefit of
Chapter 13 reorganization to a debtor who has previously filed for Chapter 7 relief.
Id.
17. 11 U.S.C. § 524(c) provides that the debtor and the holder of a claim can enter into an
agreement whereby the debtor will retain personal liability for the debt if certain conditions
are met. 11 U.S.C. § 524(c) (1988). Generally, a debtor enters into this kind of agreement as
a condition to retaining possession of certain property he has provided as collateral to a
creditor.
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1990 Annual Survey of Virginia Law article on bankruptcy law,18
the author analyzed the then-recent Virginia bankruptcy court
opinion, In re Townside Partners, Ltd. 9 In In re Brandon As-
socs,20 a Virginia bankruptcy court expanded on the court's deci-
sion in Townside. In addition, the 1992 Virginia General Assembly
enacted a new statute which addresses the perfection of liens or
interests in rents and profits received from real estate.2'
1. In re Brandon Associates
The Virginia Uniform Commercial Code does not apply to the
"creation or transfer of an interest in or lien on real estate. '22 In-
stead, a secured creditor's interest in rents obtained in connection
with real estate is created by an assignment of rents recorded
against the real property. A secured creditor's interest in rents cre-
ated under an assignment of rents clause is governed by state
law.23
18. Condyles, supra note 14, at 618.
19. 125 B.R. 8 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1991).
20. 128 B.R. 729 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1991).
21. Act of Mar. 2, 1992, ch. 67, 1992 Va. Acts 65 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 55-220.1
(Cum. Supp. 1992)). The text of the statute reads as follows:
Upon recordation, pursuant to § 55-106, in the county or city in which the real prop-
erty is located, of any deed, deed of trust or other instrument granting, transferring
or assigning the interest of the grantor, transferor, assignor, pledgor or lessor in
leases, rents or profits arising from the real property described in such deed, deed of
trust or other instrument, the interest of the grantee, transferee, pledgee or assignee
shall be fully perfected as to the assignor and all third parties without the necessity
of (i) furnishing notice to the assignor or lessee, (ii) obtaining possession of the real
property, (iii) impounding the rents, (iv) securing the appointment of a receiver, or
Cv) taking any other affirmative action. The lessee is authorized to pay the assignor
until the lessee receives written notification that rents due or to become due have
been assigned and that payment is to be made to the assignee.
Id.
22. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9-104(j) (Repl. Vol. 1991).
23. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979). In Butner, which was decided under the
former Bankruptcy Act, the Court addressed the interaction of state law and federal law
regarding the relationship of the interests of a secured creditor and a debtor under an as-
signment of rents clause. Generally, state law governs the relationship between secured
creditors and debtors. With respect to assignment of rents, the Court specifically stated:
The constitutional authority of Congress to establish 'uniform Laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies throughout the United States' would clearly encompass a federal stat-
ute defining the mortgagee's interest in the rents and profits earned by property in a
bankrupt estate. But Congress has not chosen to exercise its power to fashion any
such rule. . . .Congress has generally left the determination of property rights in
assets of a bankruptcy estate to state law.
Id. at 54 (citing U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4) (footnotes omitted).
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The property interest granted a secured creditor under an in-
strument creating an assignment of rents is important in a bank-
ruptcy context since the issue determines the debtor's right to use
such property in a Chapter 11 reorganization. Under Chapter 11,
the debtor has broad authority to use estate property for the oper-
ation of its business in the ordinary course.24 However, the Bank-
ruptcy Code provides a secured creditor with special protection
when the creditor's collateral is in the form of "cash collateral. 25
Specifically, a debtor is prohibited from using cash collateral with-
out first obtaining the creditor's consent or court authority.26 By
affording a creditor this protection, the Bankruptcy Code prevents
the creditor from becoming an involuntary lender.
In Townside, the debtor acquired an apartment complex against
which a deed of trust, containing an assignment of rents clause,
was executed and properly recorded. In finding that the clause
granted an absolute assignment of rents, the court distinguished
the facts of In re Vienna Park Properties,27 a New York bank-
ruptcy court decision interpreting Virginia law.28 The court noted
that the assignment of rents clause contained in the Vienna Park
deed of trust required further action to be taken by the creditor in
order to obtain the rents; therefore, a present and irrevocable as-
signment of rents did not exist.29
24. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(1) (1988).
25. The Bankruptcy Code defines cash collateral broadly to mean:
cash, negotiable instruments, documents, documents of title, securities, deposit ac-
counts or other cash equivalents whenever acquired in which the estate and an entity
other than the estate have an interest[,] includ[ing] the proceeds, products, offspring,
rents or profits of property subject to a security interest as provided in § 552(b) .. .
whether existing before or after the commencement of a case under [the Bankruptcy
Code].
11 U.S.C. § 363(a) (1988).
26. Id. § 363(c)(2).
27. 120 B.R. 332 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990), clarified in In re Vienna Park Properties, 128
B.R. 373 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991).
28. In distinguishing Vienna Park, the court in Townside stated:
Further, there is nothing in the Wrap Deed of Trust which indicates that the secured
creditor would be required to do anything further to perfect its lien in the rents.
Unlike the deed of trust in Vienna Park, . . . the provisions for assignment of rents
in the Wrap Deed of Trust do not contain language which would indicate that the
ruling in Frayser's case should control. In Vienna Park, the assignment of rents pro-
vision recited that the rents were additional security and provided that upon acceler-
ation of the deed of trust the lender was entitled to take possession of the property
and manage it and collect the rents.
In re Townside Partners, Ltd., 125 B.R. 8, 10-11 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1991).
29. Id. at 11. The Townside court stated that:
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In Brandon, the same Virginia bankruptcy court found that the
assignment of rents language contained in two deeds of trust held
by different creditors did not contain the same absolute language
found in Townside. Instead, the court decided that the assignment
of rents language indicated the parties intended to follow Virginia
case law which provides "that a mortgagor is entitled to the rents
until the mortgagee either takes possession of the premises or ob-
tains the appointment of a receiver." 30 The failure of the assign-
ment of rents provision to grant the secured creditor a present en-
titlement to the rents appears to be the basis for the court's
distinction between the facts of Brandon and those of Townside.3 1
Based on the assignment of rents clause language, the bank-
ruptcy court found that the secured creditors and the debtor in
Brandon maintained an interest in the rents from the property.32
The court found that the interest granted to the secured creditors
was perfected as to the debtor and third parties as a result of the
recordation of the deed of trust.33 However, because of the auto-
matic stay imposed by section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code, the
creditors were not permitted to enforce their interests against the
debtor.3 4 The court ultimately did conclude that the creditors' in-
terests constituted cash collateral.3 5
[t]he language of the Wrap Deed of Trust in the case at bar clearly distinguishes it
from the Vienna Park case and dictates a different result. At the time of the filing of
the petition for relief in the case at bar, the debtor was merely serving as an agent for
the beneficiaries of the Wrap Deed of Trust to collect rent and pay the rent proceeds
as directed by the terms of the Wrap Deed of Trust. The assignment was present and
irrevocable. The only condition which would remove the assignment was payment of
the obligation secured by the deed of trust.
Id.
30. In re Brandon Assocs., 128 B.R. 729, 732 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1991) (citing Fraser's Ad-
min. v. R & A R.R. Co., 87 Va. 388, 391 (1866)).
31. See id. at 731. The language of the deeds of trust in Brandon provided that the se-
cured creditor received an assignment of rents upon the execution of the deeds of trust but
that the entitlement to actually receive the rent would remain with the grantor unless a
default under the instrument occurred. Id.
32. Id. at 733.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 733-34. Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that the filing of the
debtor's bankruptcy petition stays "any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against
property of the estate." 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4) (1988).
35. In re Brandon Assocs., 128 B.R. at 733-34. To determine whether an unenforceable
interest in rents constitutes cash collateral, the Brandon court first reviewed the decision in
In re Raleigh/Spring Forest Apartments Assocs., 118 B.R. 42 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1990). In
Raleigh, the court held that while the assignments of rents were perfected, they were also
conditional. Some further action by the creditors was required before the creditors could
enforce their entitlement to the rents. Id. at 45. The Raleigh court found that the creditors'
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Although rents may constitute cash collateral in certain situa-
tions, a debtor may retain control over the use of the rents if the
creditor's interest is adequately protected. 8 In Brandon, the court
held that a creditor's right to adequate protection could not rise
higher than the protection given to a creditor under state law
where no bankruptcy was involved.3 7 Absent bankruptcy, the court
found that the secured creditor or a receiver would apply rents
first to maintenance and to costs of preserving the property. Ac-
cordingly, the court permitted the debtor to use cash collateral for
such purposes without granting the creditor any further
protection. 8
2. Section 55-220.1 of the Code of Virginia
The 1992 Session of the Virginia General Assembly enacted a
new statute which is intended to clarify existing state law regard-
ing assignment of rents.3 9 Section 55-220.1 provides that an assign-
ment of an interest in rents or profits arising from real property
shall be fully perfected as to the assignor and all third parties upon
recordation pursuant to section 55-106 of the Code of Virginia.4 °
Upon recordation, the assignment is perfected and the creditor
does not need to take any additional measures such as furnishing
notice to the assignor or the lessee, obtaining possession of the real
property, impounding the rents or securing the appointment of a
receiver. However, the perfected secured creditor is not entitled to
unenforceable interests were "too remote to qualify as cash collateral." Id. Despite the fac-
tual similarities between Brandon and Raleigh, the Brandon court declined to follow the
Raleigh court's holding. Instead, the court adopted the view taken in In re KNM Roswell
Ltd. Partnership, 126 B.R 548 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991). In KNM Roswell, the court held that
a creditor's perfected but inchoate interest in rents constituted cash collateral under §
363(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. 126 B.R. at 556.
36. 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (1988). See In re Pub. Serv. Co., 88 B.R. 563, 566 (Bankr. D.N.H.
1988); In re Fluge, 57 B.R. 451, 457 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985); In re Oak Glen R-Vee, 8 B.R.
213, 216 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981); In re Gaslight Village, Inc., 6 B.R. 871, 875 (Bankr. D.
Conn. 1980).
37. In re Brandon Assocs., 128 B.R. at 734.
38. Id.
39. Act of Mar. 2, 1992, ch. 67, 1992 Va. Acts 65 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 55-220.1
(Cum. Supp. 1992)). Several states have enacted laws to clarify assignment of rents issues.
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 697.07 (West Supp. 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 559.17 (West 1985);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-26-116 (CuM. Supp. 1991); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 7.28.230 (West
Supp. 1992).
40. See supra note 21.
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possession of the rents until the lessee is provided written notifica-
tion directing future payments to be made to the assignee.4'
It appears that section 55-220.1 was modeled after a similar Ten-
nessee law.42 As a result, judicial interpretations of this section of
the Tennessee Code should influence how courts apply the new
Virginia statute.
In In re McCutchen,43 a Tennessee bankruptcy court analyzed
the Tennessee assignment of rents statute to determine whether
certain rents from real estate constituted cash collateral. Like Vir-
ginia's statute, Tennessee's law provides that an assignee's interest
in rents is fully perfected upon the recording of the instrument
where the real estate is located, without the assignee taking any
other affirmative action. In addition, the Tennessee Code provides
that the secured creditor is not entitled to possession of rents until
proper notice is given to the lessee of the property.44
Interpreting the Tennessee statute, the bankruptcy court found
the perfection of the security interest in the rents was not at issue,
since the instrument was properly recorded. However, since the
lessee was not given pre-petition notice in accordance with the
statute, the secured creditor was not entitled to possession of the
rents.45 Furthermore, since the secured creditor was not entitled to
the rents pre-petition, the automatic stay enjoined the creditor
from taking action to enforce its lien or to obtain possession of the
rents. The court noted, however, that the creditor's lack of entitle-
ment to the rents did not preclude a determination that the rents
constituted cash collateral.46
41. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-220.1 (Cum. Supp. 1992).
42. Compare id. with TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-26-116 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
43. 115 B.R. 126 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1990).
44. TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-426-116 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
45. In re McCutchen, 115 B.R. at 132.
46. Id. The McCutcheon court adopted the analysis contained in In re Pavilion Place
Assocs., 89 B.R. 36 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988), and quoted the Pavilion decision as follows:
[aln enforceable interest regarding an assignment of rents arises in favor of the as-
signee upon the creation of a security interest. The right to actual enforcement, how-
ever, is subject to the occurrence of statutory and contractual conditions precedent.
While the conditions precedent might'not have occurred as of filing regarding the
Pavilion rents, that does not change the fact that the post-petition rents are subject
to the Fund's security interest and become its cash collateral under 11 U.S.C. § 363.
It is true that the automatic stay prevents the Fund from undertaking steps to en-
force its rights in the cash collateral. However, it is equally true that the Debtor is
prohibited from using the same cash collateral without first obtaining an order al-
lowing the use pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363.
In re McCutchen, 115 B.R. at 132 (quoting In re Pavilion Place Assocs., 89 B.R. at 39).
1992] 643
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The court's holding in McCutchen is remarkably similar to the
Brandon court's ruling, which was rendered prior to Virginia's en-
actment of the assignment of rents statute. In both instances, a
secured creditor maintained a perfected security interest in the
rents. In addition, both courts found that the rents constituted
cash collateral to which the creditors would be entitled only after
they obtained relief from the automatic stay. Both debtors were
entitled to the use of the cash collateral only upon a showing that
the creditors were adequately protected.
The bankruptcy court's decision in Brandon and the General As-
sembly's enactment of section 55-220.1 clarifies Virginia law re-
garding assignment of rents. In addition, the new statute entitles a
secured creditor to rents if the contractual condition precedents
have occurred and written notice to the lessee has been provided. 7
This change parallels section 8.9-318(3) of the Code of Virginia re-
garding the assignment of accounts receivable and greatly benefits
secured creditors. Accordingly, the changes that have occurred
with respect to assignment of rents clauses strengthen the ability
of secured creditors to collect debts that are due.
C. Voiding Liens
Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in In re Dewsnup,8 a
split of authority existed over whether a Chapter 7 debtor could
void the undersecured portion of a lien on abandoned real prop-
erty. 9 Section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code created the basis for
debtors voiding the undersecured portion of a lien.50 This section
provides that "[t]o the extent that a lien secures a claim against
the debtor that is not an allowed secured claim, such lien is
void. .... 51
A majority of courts have held that section 506(d) allows the
Chapter 7 debtor to void the portion of the lien that exceeds the
value of the property, regardless of whether the estate has aban-
47. In re Townside Partners Ltd., 125 B.R. 8 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1991), the bankruptcy
court ruled that a secured creditor is only entitled to rents if there is an absolute contractual
entitlement, the creditor maintains possession of the property, or a receiver has been ap-
pointed. Id. at 10.
48. 111 S. Ct. 773 (1991).
49. See infra notes 52 and 53.
50. 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) (1988).
51. Id.
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doned the property.5 2 A strong minority of courts ruling on the is-
sue, represented by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in
In re Dewsnup,5' have decided that section 506(d) cannot be used
to void liens on abandoned property." The U.S. Supreme Court
recently affirmed the Tenth Circuit's decision in Dewsnup, thus
endorsing the minority view.
In Dewsnup, the debtor owed approximately $120,000.00 to a
creditor. This debt was secured by a deed of trust on two parcels of
real estate. The debtor sought to void the undersecured portion of
the lien pursuant to section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code. At the
trial level, the bankruptcy court determined that the value of the
land subject to the deed of trust was $39,000.00. Since the real es-
tate had been abandoned by the trustee,55 the bankruptcy court
held that section 506(d) could not be used to void the under-
secured portion of the creditor's lien. The U.S. district court af-
firmed the bankruptcy court's ruling. This decision was subse-
quently affirmed by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
In determining that the undersecured portion of a lien cannot be
voided when the real estate has been abandoned, the U.S. Supreme
Court found that Congress, in drafting section 506(d), did not in-
tend "to depart from the pre-Code rule that liens passed through
bankruptcy unaffected."5 " The Court found that, unless a credi-
tor's lien is fully protected until the creditor decides to foreclose,
52. See Gaglia v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n., 889 F.2d 1304 (3d Cir. 1989); In re
Brouse, 110 B.R. 539 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990); In re Moses, 110 B.R. 962 (Bankr. N.D. Okla.
1990); In re Zlogar, 101 B.R. 1 (Bankr. N.D. Il. 1989); In re Tanner, 14 B.R. 933 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. 1981); see also In re Folendore, 862 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir. 1989); In re Lindsey, 823
F.2d 189 (7th Cir. 1987).
53. 908 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1990), af'd sub nom. Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773 (1991).
54. See id; In re Lange, 120 B.R. 132 (9th Cir. BAP 1990); In re Mammoser, 115 B.R. 758
(Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1990); In re Shrum, 98 B.R. 995 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1989); In re
Maitland, 61 B.R. 130 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986). There are three basic reasons asserted by
these courts to support the determination that an undersecured lien should not be voided
against property under § 506(d). These are: (1) property abandoned by the trustee under 11
U.S.C. § 554 is not "property in which the estate has an interest" under the language of §
506(a) and as a result no portion of the lien may be voided under § 506(d); (2) allowing a
lien to be voided inequitably gives debtors more in Chapter 7 than debtors receive in reor-
ganization chapters; and (3) allowing a lien to be voided under § 506(d) renders 11 U.S.C. §
722 redundant; this section provides that a debtor has the right to redeem personal property
but not real property. In re Dewsnup, 908 F.2d at 589-90.
55. 11 U.S.C. § 554 provides that "the trustee may abandon any property of the estate
that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value and benefit to the es-
tate." Id. The abandonment of property of the estate by the debtor provides for the re-
vestment of the asset with the debtor.
56. Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. of 778.
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the secured creditor would lose the benefit of any increase in the
value of the collateral that may occur prior to foreclosure. In that
circumstance, any increase in value would accrue to the benefit of
the debtor and constitute a windfall. Explaining, the Court stated:
"[a]ny increase over the judicially determined valuation during
bankruptcy rightly accrues to the benefit of the creditor, not to the
benefit of the debtor and not to the benefit of other unsecured
creditors whose claims have been allowed and who had nothing to
do with the mortgagor-mortgagee bargain. '57 In addition, because
section 506(d) may have other applications in different fact pat-
terns, the Court concluded that its holding should be limited to the
facts currently before it.5s
The Court's decision in Dewsnup affirmed In re Hargrove,"9 a
Virginia federal district court decision. In Hargrove, the district
court reversed the bankruptcy court's decision and found that sec-
tion 506(d) did not allow for the voidance of the undersecured por-
tion of a lien against abandoned real estate. To support its ruling,
the Court cited a similar finding by a Virginia bankruptcy court in
In re Maitland.6 0 Although the Dewsnup Court relied on different
grounds for its decision,"1 the Court's holding is in accord with the
Hargrove and Maitland rulings.
Assuming the Dewsnup decision is limited to its particular facts,
the case will not greatly alter existing bankruptcy law. However,
because of the broad language used and the basis upon which the
Court made its decision, this case could potentially affect other
Bankruptcy Code provisions. For instance, the term "allowed se-
cured claim" is referred to in several provisions of the Bankruptcy
57. Id.
58. Id. Specifically, the court stated that
[h]ypothetical applications that come to mind and those advanced at oral argument
illustrate the difficulty of interpreting the statute [11 U.S.C. § 506(d)] in a single
opinion that would apply to all possible factual situations. We therefore focus upon
the case before us and allow other facts to await a legal resolution on another day.
Id.
59. 133 B.R. 765 (E.D. Va. 1991).
60. 61 B.R. 130 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986).
61. In Hargrove and Maitland, the courts relied on the three traditional reasons asserted
by courts for limiting the application of § 506(d). See supra note 54. In Dewsnup, the U.S.
Supreme Court instead relied on the meaning of the term "allowed secured claim" con-
tained in § 506(d). The Court found that this term was not intended to refer to § 506(a),
which provides that an allowed claim is a secured claim to the extent of the value of the
creditor's interest in the property. Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 778. An allowed secured claim is
not governed by the bifurcation provisions of § 506(a); instead, the allowance of claims pro-
vision of § 502 of the Bankruptcy Code is controlling. Id.
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Code. 2 If Dewsnup is interpreted as defining this term as it ap-
plies to all Code provisions, the effect of the decision may be of
greater consequence.
D. Avoidance of Judicial Liens
Section 522(f) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a debtor
may avoid a judicial lien on property to the extent that the "lien
impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been enti-
tled. '6 3 Section 522(b) of the Bankruptcy Code further authorizes
individual debtors to exempt certain property interests from the
bankruptcy estate.6 4 This section allows a state to "opt out" of the
federal bankruptcy exemptions and to adopt separate exemp-
tions.65 Virginia has "opted out" pursuant to this provision. 6
Two recent Virginia bankruptcy court decisions have interpreted
the provisions of section 522(f) to determine whether, in order to
avoid a judicial lien, an exemption must have been claimed by the
debtor . 7 In In re Wall6 s and In re Tarpley, 9 the respective bank-
ruptcy courts determined that section 522(f) could not be used to
avoid a judicial lien which impaired an exemption that the debtor
had not properly claimed. In Watl, the debtor moved to avoid a
judgment lien against his residence on the basis that it impaired a
homestead exemption he was entitled to claim.70 Because the
debtor failed to claim the homestead exemption within the appro-
priate time,7' the court had to determine whether the debtor could
avoid liens on property not properly claimed as exempt.
62. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5) (1988) (setting forth the treatment of an "allowed secured
claim" in individual reorganizations); 11 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(5) (1988) (setting forth treatment
of an "allowed secured claim" in a family farmer's reorganization plan); 11 U.S.C. § 722
(1988) (allowing a Chapter 7 debtor to redeem specified tangible personal property in cer-
tain instances "by paying the holder of a lien the amount of the holder's allowed secured
claim that is secured by such liens").
63. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1988).
64. Id. § 522(b).
65. Id. § 522(b)(1).
66. VA. CODE ANN. §34-3.1 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
67. See In re Wall, 127 B.R. 353 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1991); In re Tarpley, 123 B.R. 741
(Bankr. W.D. Va. 1991).
68. In re Wall, 127 B.R. at 355-56.
69. In re Tarpley, 123 B.R. at 744.
70. The homestead exemption is one of the primary exemptions available to debtors in
Virginia. The exemption grants a debtor the right to claim as exempt any property, real or
personal, up to $5,000.00 in value. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-4 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
71. The homestead exemption must be claimed "on or before the fifth day after the date
initially set for the meeting of creditors." Id. § 34-17.
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Although the court recognized that "on its face § 522(f) might be
construed not to require that the exemption actually be taken, 72 it
ruled that a lien cannot be avoided in such instances. The court
found that the purpose behind section 522(f) is to promote the
fresh start policy of the Bankruptcy Code.73 This policy would not
be furthered by debtors avoiding liens on property that is not
properly claimed to be exempt in bankruptcy.74 Similarly, the
court in Tarpley concluded that Chapter 13 debtors also must
properly claim exemptions before they may avoid judgment liens
against their property.75
III. OBJECTIONS TO THE DISCHARGEABILITY OF DEBTS
Several recent decisions have addressed whether a debtor is enti-
tled to a discharge of debts in connection with his bankruptcy case.
Two Virginia bankruptcy courts examined whether a divorce de-
cree creates an obligation of the debtor that is in the nature of
"alimony, maintenance, or support" so that the debt would not be
discharged in bankruptcy.7 1 In both In re Welborn 77 and In re Fer-
ebee, 7 8 the courts relied on the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals'
decision in Melichar v. Ost. e Both bankruptcy courts determined
that the parties' intention to treat payments due under a divorce
decree as "alimony, maintenance, or support" rather than as a
property settlement controlled whether the debts were
dischargeable. °
72. In re Wall, 127 B.R. at 355.
73. Id. at 355-56.
74. Id.
75. In re Tarpley, 123 B.R. at 744.
76. Section 523(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code provides, in pertinent part, that an individ-
ual debtor is not discharged of any debt:
(5) to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to, maintenance
for, or support of such spouse or child, in connection with a separation agreement,
divorce decree or other order of a court of record, determination made in accordance
with State or territorial law by a governmental unit, or property settlement agree-
ment, but not to the extent that -
(B) such debt includes a liability designated as alimony, maintenance, or support,
unless such liability is actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support.
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1988).
77. 126 B.R. 948 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1991).
78. 129 B.R. 71 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1991).
79. 661 F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 1981).
80. In Welborn, the bankruptcy court stated that "[t]he Fourth Circuit has made clear
that '[t]he proper test of whether the payments are alimony lies in proof of whether it was
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In Welborn, the bankruptcy court found that it was not the mu-
tual intent of both spouses to treat an indemnification provision
contained in their divorce settlement agreement as "alimony,
maintenance, or support."81 In Ferebee, on the other hand, the
court concluded that the characterization used by the parties in
the settlement agreement was highly probative of the parties' mu-
tual intent to treat the obligations in the agreement as "alimony,
maintenance, or support. '8 2 As a result, the Ferebee court found
that the debtor spouse's obligation was not dischargeable. A com-
parison of the two decisions illustrates the importance of drafting
divorce settlement agreements that clearly indicate the parties' in-
tentions to treat obligations as "alimony, maintenance, or sup-
port," and not as a property settlement.
In Hudgins v. Davidson,"3 a Virginia federal district court ad-
dressed whether a Chapter 7 trustee was barred from bringing an
action- to revoke a debtor's discharge under the doctrine of res
judicata on the basis that a creditor had already sought to raise
similar grounds in connection with an action to deny the debtor a
discharge.8 4 The creditor had filed a complaint objecting to the
debtor's discharge on the grounds of debtor fraud and misrepre-
sentation of assets. The bankruptcy court found in favor of the
debtor and granted a discharge. Subsequently, the Chapter 7 trus-
tee filed a complaint to revoke the discharge.
The court, in addressing whether the doctrine of res judicata
precluded the trustee's action, analyzed whether the creditor and
the trustee were in privity in the case. The court noted that "priv-
ity exists for purposes of res judicata where two parties represent
the interests of the same entity, and this relationship may exist
the intention of the parties that the payments be for support rather than as a property
settlement.'" In re Welborn, 126 B.R. at 950 (quoting Melichar, 661 F.2d at 303).
81. Id. at 950-51 ("[T]he intent of the parties to that agreement is determinative of
whether the obligation is in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support.").
82. In re Ferebee, 129 B.R. at 74-75.
83. 127 B.R. 6 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1991).
84. Id. at 7. In the complaint brought by the creditor objecting to the debtor's discharge,
the creditor had moved to amend his complaint to allege additional grounds of fraud. The
bankruptcy court denied the creditor's request and the case proceeded to trial. The trustee,
in its complaint to revoke the debtor's discharge, alleged essentially the same facts that the
bankruptcy court had precluded the creditor from raising in his complaint. Id. As a result,
the facts asserted by the trustee had not previously been considered by the bankruptcy
court. The court determined that the doctrine of res judicata prohibits not only the relitiga-
tion of issues actually decided previously, but also the relitigation of matters which could
have been presented for determination where the same parties or their privies are involved,
Id. at 8.
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between a creditor and a trustee in some cases." 5 In this instance,
however, the district court found that the creditor was acting
mainly, if not completely, in his individual capacity and that the
trustee was not in privity with the creditor.
As a result, the court held that the remaining creditors' inter-
ests, which were being represented by the trustee with respect to
the complaint to revoke discharge, should not be affected by the
prior action brought by a single creditor. The district court found
that the doctrine of res judicata did not apply and allowed the
trustee's action to proceed.86 The court, however, reserved ruling
on whether the principles of res judicata would affect the creditor's
entitlement to any benefit from the trustee's efforts to revoke the
debtor's discharge in the event the trustee was successful.8 7
IV. PROPERTY EXEMPTIONS
Several recent decisions have determined a debtor's rights re-
garding property exemptions in bankruptcy."8 In Wissman v. Pitts-
burgh National Bank, 9 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that a debtor's property can be exempt from the estate without
abandonment of the property by the trustee.9 ° In Wissman, the
debtor claimed as exempt a cause of action against a creditor bank
arising out of the bank's foreclosure on certain collateral. A timely
objection to the debtor's exemption was not filed and the debtor
proceeded in federal district court to enforce its claim. The district
court granted the bank's motion to dismiss on the basis that, under
the Bankruptcy Code, formal abandonment of the cause of action
by the trustee was necessary for the debtor to be entitled to raise
the cause of action.9 1 However, the Fourth Circuit reversed the dis-
trict court's decision and found the abandonment of property by
85. Id. at 8.
86. Id. The court stated that
[i]t cannot be said in this case that the trustee had an opportunity to litigate this
claim previously, nor that the interests of all creditors were represented by a single
creditor's suit to deny discharge. Therefore, the court finds that identity of the par-
ties has not been established, and the claim of the trustee is not precluded by the
doctrine of res judicata.
Id. at 9.
87. Id. at 8.
88. See also text accompanying notes 65-69.
89. 942 F.2d 867 (4th Cir. 1991).
90. Id. at 869-70.
91. See supra note 55.
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the trustee not to be a prerequisite to the debtor's enforcement of
a properly claimed exemption where no objection had been
raised.92
Although the debtor properly claimed the exemption of the
cause of action against the bank, no value of the debtor's interest
was asserted. Because a statutory limitation existed on the amount
that could be exempt, the court found that the debtor's exemption
could not exceed the statutory limit. The Fourth Circuit did find
that, in order for the debtor to receive an amount in excess of the
statutory limit, the trustee would have to first abandon his interest
in the claim. 3
In In re Spraker,94 a debtor sought to exempt certain shares of
stock in a corporation and interests in a partnership from his
bankruptcy estate under Virginia's homestead exemption. The
Chapter 7 trustee objected to the debtor's exemption on the basis
that the trustee had received an offer to purchase all of the
debtor's shares of stock and partnership interests. The bankruptcy
court held that the debtor was not entitled to exempt only a por-
tion of the stock or partnership interest. Instead, the debtor could
be required to accept a cash payment in place of retaining a por-
tion of the stock or partnership interests.9 5
To support its decision, the bankruptcy court relied on the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court's ruling in Hawpe v. Bumgardner.96 In
Hawpe, the court found that a special commissioner could sell real
estate subject to an individual's homestead exemption and satisfy
the exemption from any proceeds remaining after all superior liens
were satisfied.9 7 The Spraker court stated that "[t]he Hawpe deci-
92. 942 F.2d at 869.
93. Id. at 872. Based on the United States Supreme Court's more recent ruling in Taylor
v. Freeland & Kronz, 112 S. Ct. 1644 (1992), it would appear that the debtor would be
entitled to receive an amount in excess of the statutory limit of the exemption, even if the
claim was not abandoned, if the debtor had exempted the full amount of the claim. In Tay-
lor the Supreme Court held that where an objection to an exemption has not been filed
within the period prescribed by FED. R. BANKR P. 4003(b), an amount in excess of the statu-
tory limit can be exempted from the bankruptcy estate even though the debtor had no
colorable basis for claiming the excess amount as exempt. Id. at 1647-48.
94. 128 B.R. 727 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1991).
95. Id. at 728. Virginia's homestead exemption provides that "[elvery householder shall
be entitled ... to hold exempt from creditor process arising out of a debt, real and personal
property, or either, to be selected by the householder, including money and debts due the
householder not exceeding $5,000.00 in value." VA. CODE ANN. § 34-4 (Repl. Vol. 1988).
96. 103 Va. 91, 48 S.E. 554 (1904).
97. Id. at 97, 48 S.E. at 556-57.
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sion holds that a debtor's property may be sold and the homestead
paid in cash rather than in kind."98 It is unclear from the facts in
Spraker, however, if the court gave any consideration to the Chap-
ter 7 trustee's ability to sell only that portion of the stock or part-
nership interests that exceeds the debtor's homestead exemption.
98. In re Spraker, 128 B.R. at 729.
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